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Crossing the Green Line:
Anti-Settler Sentiment in Cyprus
Adrienne Christiansen

J

ust seconds from the main airport exit in Larnaca, Cyprus, a large
new permanent sign greets thousands of daily tourists and visitors.
It reads: WE DEMAND ALL TURKISH TROOPS AND SETTLERS
LEAVE CYPRUS. Standing in stark contrast to the norms of hospitality for which the country is justly famous, the sign announces that all
is not well on Aphrodite’s island. Unfortunately, the airport message
is no anomaly; rather, it is a harbinger of anti-immigrant sentiment
that permeates Cyprus. An older, rusted but identical sign is located at
another popular tourist site, the Ledra Palace checkpoint on the “Green
Line” in downtown Lefkosia.1
Given their attempt to evoke attention and sympathy from tourists, the signs at the airport and the Green Line are comparatively
mild in their insistence that Turkish immigrants, commonly referred
to as “settlers,” be expelled from Cyprus. Pejorative and inflammatory
statements against this population frequently are printed in the Greek
Cypriot press. Turkish immigrants commonly are described in newspaper reports or during informal conversation as dark, dirty, black
beards, peasants, squatters, interlopers, illegal occupiers, criminals,
rapists, thieves, drug-dealers, uneducated, poor, unclean, lazy, religious, gypsies, or even “Anatolian apes.” Anti-immigrant sentiment
was everywhere when I lived on the island during the fall of 2003.2
Even the words “settler,” “Turk,” and “Muslim” served as vicious
epithets. Regardless of whether I was on the north or south side of the
Green Line, no one in my company flinched upon hearing a settler
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slur. No one raised objections. No one apologized or muttered halfheartedly that, “I am no racist, but…”3
Originally, the animus reflected in the anti-Turkish-immigrant talk
surprised and disturbed me because of its hostile tenor and ubiquity.
I was accustomed to Americans who try to rhetorically “soften the
blow” of their racial epithets by denying their bigotry or racial intent.
Additionally, anti-racist sensibilities and sensitivities in the United
States have been heightened sufficiently so that racist discourse can
produce outrage and protest, followed by apologies, heart-felt or not.
Racism in the United States is still widespread, but racial talk is increasingly policed. Not so in Cyprus.
Over time, I became less surprised by the anti-settler slurs, though
no less discomforted. As I turned my attention to these denigrating
discourse practices, I discovered that Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike
have very good reasons to vigorously oppose the policies that have
brought between 50,000 and 120,000 mainland Turks to Cyprus in
the wake of the island’s de facto partition in 1974.4 These immigration
policies have heightened tensions and prompted political, social, and
economic dislocations that, even in the best of circumstances, would
challenge most societies. The conflict over Turkish settlers in northern
Cyprus is especially potent because it adds highly emotional issues to
an already tense situation, including human rights violations, refugees’
agony, resentments about property losses, anger and humiliation over
military losses, fears of electoral manipulation, anxieties about cultural
and demographic displacement, and anger over the perceived “Turkification” of northern Cyprus.
Expressing opposition to a policy and its effects too frequently
involves denigrating a people—a practice not limited to Cyprus. The
slurs against Turkish settlers discomforted me in part because they so
strongly reminded me of the language Americans use to insult both
African-Americans and immigrants in the United States. My original
research project was to analyze the rhetoric of Cyprus’ Greek/Turkish
ethno-nationalist conflict as reflected in political statuary and monuments. But even though I had gone abroad to learn about political
language practices in a culture that was not my own, I found myself
unable to ignore slurs against Turkish immigrants, nor their similarity
to American racial epithets.
Pursuing this project on “anti-settler talk” generates numerous troubling questions and raises ethical dilemmas for me as a scholar new
to international research. For example, does drawing attention to one
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of the lesser-known schisms in Cyprus subtly suggest that I believe
Americans are better than Cypriots in dealing with ethnic and/or racial
conflicts? After having accepted the warm hospitality of my Cypriot
hosts for many months, is it unconscionably rude of me to write about
the derogatory depiction of Turkish settlers in the press and in everyday talk? Is it possible for me to write about the fascinating rhetorical
and discursive components of the settler issue without seeming to
make a moral judgment against people for whom I care deeply? And
how should I handle the pressures put on me to publicly denounce
the Turkish military and the Turkish government that sent the immigrants to the island in the first place? Can anything I write about this
topic possibly be read as scholarship rather than an articulation of
my supposedly “pro-Turkey” bias? After all, merely having attended
Macalester’s Faculty Development International Seminar in Istanbul
and expressing interest in the humanitarian plight of Turkish settlers
has already led to angry and painful denunciations of me by Greek
Cypriot friends. Lastly, I wonder whether publishing this essay will
destroy any hope of ever doing research on Cyprus in the future.
Unattractive and difficult as it is to discuss, anti-settler sentiment
in Cyprus is significant for reasons that both include and go beyond
moral and humanitarian considerations. What appears on its face to
be “simple” racist speech is considerably more complex. The anti-settler slurs symbolically capture important political issues on Cyprus. In
particular, the sign outside the Larnaca airport succinctly articulates
two of the most entrenched barriers to diplomatic reunification efforts
on the island.5 The sign also provides a glimpse into simmering demographic and multicultural politics that divide the island, demographics that extend beyond the more familiar conflict between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots. Perhaps most importantly, the pejorative discourse
about Turkish settlers cannot be dismissed as a case of historic hatreds
or cross-ethnic animosities, for slurs against Turkish immigrants are
echoed on both sides of the island. That is, Greek Cypriots talk about
the settlers in ways nearly identical to how Turkish Cypriots talk about
Turkish settlers. Signs demanding that Turkish troops and settlers leave
the island might easily be found at Ercan Airport in the north were it
not for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) oppressive
squelching of dissent and critique of its policies, combined with terrorist threats from fascist groups like the notorious “Grey Wolves.”6 As
such, the racist slurs against Turkish settlers confound easy notions of
identity politics and underscore the reality that racist speech is often
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not about race, but also (or instead) reflects fears—of difference, or
political, social, and economic changes.
In this essay, I briefly examine Cyprus’ modern history and the
political policies that led to large numbers of Turkish immigrants moving to the island in order to draw attention to an important aspect of
the “Cyprus problem” that frequently goes unnoticed because it is
overshadowed by the more familiar ethno-nationalist conflict between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots.7 Anti-settler talk in Cyprus reminds us
that discriminatory social and political practices almost always occur
in an environment that is also rich in linguistic derogation and scapegoating. In this case, the discursive “Green Line” between Greeks and
Turks has disappeared, thus creating space for unusually rare common ground. Unfortunately, that shared discursive space comes at the
expense of desperately poor and underprivileged Turkish immigrants
who are caught in their own version of “no man’s land.”
*****
To better understand the conditions leading to the wide array of slurs
against Turkish settlers, one must first understand the historical and
political exigencies that brought these immigrants to the island in the
first place. The historical record demonstrates definitively that “others”
have been coming to, and settling in, Cyprus for thousands of years. In
this sense, the Turkish settler issue must be seen as a part of broader
historical phenomena on the island. Due to its rich resources like copper and agricultural produce, as well as its geostrategic location at
the crossroads of Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East, Cyprus
has been attractive to a host of foreign conquerors with multiple invasions the result. According to political scientist Joseph Joseph, Cyprus
“has been ruled by Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Ptolemies, Romans,
Byzantines, Franks, Venetians, Ottoman Turks, and British.”8 Turkish control over northern Cyprus in the 1970s is only the most recent
example of this historical pattern. Each of these conquerors brought
administrators and immigrants and each left their distinctive marks on
the island’s politics, language, religion, architecture, art, and culture.
The Cyprus problem frequently is treated as a conflict between two
homogenous, distinctive, and entirely antagonistic ethnic groups. But
the contemporary wrangling over the island by British, Greek, and
Turkish forces makes clear that the Cyprus problem is also a dispute
over military and economic control by foreign powers that have inter-
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vened in what they believe to be their own national interests.9 To be
sure, identity politics roil the island, but in ways that go far beyond the
familiar ethno-nationalist conflict that typically draws the attention of
scholars, diplomats, and reporters. Instead, I want to suggest that the
struggle over the role of Turkish settlers reflects broad multicultural
changes occurring all over the island.
Cyprus’ ethnic makeup has taken on ever-increasingly diverse hues
in the past several decades for reasons entirely separate from the issue
of Turkish settlers in the north. Especially in light of its booming tourism industry, its serving as a place of refuge for people fleeing war or
political upheaval, and its immigration policies on foreign workers,
Cyprus has clearly entered a “multicultural age” with its concomitant pressures. For example, of the 2.5 million tourists who visit the
island each year, more than half come from Great Britain and more
than 30,000 Brits live permanently on the island as retired expatriates.
Moreover, Cyprus has served as a place of refuge for Maronites, Armenians, Lebanese, and Russians, even though such groups frequently
experience discrimination and believe themselves to be marginalized
in Cypriot society. In addition, during the past two decades, Greek
Cypriots have brought migrant construction and domestic workers
by the tens of thousands from countries like Thailand, Sri Lanka and
the Philippines.10 In northern Cyprus, several hundred registered sex
workers known as “konsomatrices” are imported from “Eastern European nations, primarily from Moldavia, Ukraine, Belarus and Romania.”11 Like foreign construction and domestic workers in the south,
sex workers may not become citizens or even stay in the TRNC for
more than six months. Thus, even if there were no Turkish settlers in
the north, Cypriots would still be struggling with issues of enormous
economic disparities on the island, nationalism, and how to maintain
(or even define) their self-perceived “Cypriotness” during a time of
increasing multicultural influences.12 Cyprus’ recent accession to the
European Union and opening its borders to other Europeans will make
these economic, identity, and multicultural pressures even more pronounced in the future.
*****
Who are the Turkish settlers who evoke widespread disparagement
and why did they come to Cyprus? To answer these questions, one
must recall several significant historical moments that led to the cata-
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strophic events of 1974.13 In the 1950s, Greek Cypriots, with the support of Greece and the Greek Orthodox Church, began a guerilla war
against British authority in Cyprus. Independence from Britain was
merely the first step in fulfilling the Greek Cypriot goal, which was
Enosis or formal union with Greece. Turkish Cypriots feared that Enosis
would lead to annihilation by their historic Greek enemies. Consequently, Turkish Cypriots advocated a policy of complete separation,
known as Taksim. Britain manipulated ethnic tensions between Greeks
and Turks on the island in order to blunt the Greek Cypriots’ military
success and to enlist the aid of Turkish Cypriots in the guerilla war.
Greek Cypriots ultimately were successful in wresting control from
Great Britain and won the country’s independence, but they did not
fulfill their final aim of Enosis. With no representation from the “motherlands” of Greece or Turkey, Britain designed and imposed a constitution that ultimately proved to be unworkable but that protected Great
Britain’s sovereign military bases and other geostrategic interests on
the island. Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain signed a Treaty of Guarantee insuring the independence of Cyprus, its security, and its territorial integrity. In so doing, the newly independent Cyprus and the other
international players agreed to relinquish pursuit of Enosis or Taksim
policies.
Between 1963 and 1967, following a constitutional crisis in which
the democratically elected President (and Greek Archbishop) Makarios
suggested thirteen revisions that would limit Turkish Cypriot political power, separate municipalities began to develop in Cyprus’ five
main cities.14 Intense inter-ethnic violence also broke out, resulting in
more than 400 dead Turkish Cypriots and more than 200 dead Greek
Cypriots. Approximately 25,000 Turkish Cypriots withdrew into four
defended enclaves during this time.
In 1968, the Greek military junta in Athens joined with Greek
Cypriot nationalists called EOKA-B and authorized a coup against
President Makarios. Makarios had once been a strong supporter of
Enosis with Greece, but by 1968 had come to believe that Enosis was an
unrealistic goal and that it was unwise to commingle Cyprus’ political
interests with that of the Greek military dictatorship. His caution was
warranted, but it also angered the Greek junta. On July 15, 1974, the
coupists attacked the presidential palace in Lefkosia, killing approximately 3,000 Greek Cypriots and prompting President Makarios to flee
to Britain. Five days later, using as justification their role as a guarantor power as well as the protection of the Turkish Cypriot population
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from genocide, 40,000 Turkish soldiers and paratroopers invaded in
a military campaign called the “Attila Operation” (later renamed the
“Peace Operation”). Irregular Turkish Cypriot soldiers joined them
and together they fought the badly outnumbered Greek and Greek
Cypriot forces.
The Turkish military’s presence, combined with atrocities they committed against the Greek civilian population, prompted approximately
162,000 Greek Cypriots to flee their homes in northern Cyprus with little more than the clothes on their backs. In retaliation, Greek Cypriots
rounded up thousands of Turkish Cypriots living in southern Cyprus
and herded them into soccer stadiums and similar holding facilities. Afraid of their Greek Cypriot captors and pressured by Turkish
authorities to move north, approximately 50,000 Turkish Cypriots fled
their homes and moved within the next twelve months. By the time a
ceasefire was called on August 16, 1974, more than 6,000 Greek Cypriots had died, approximately 1,500 Turkish Cypriots had died, and the
Turkish Army occupied 36% of Cyprus’ territory. Both sides had large
numbers of missing soldiers and citizens, an issue that would come
to dominate the political scene in southern Cyprus for the next thirty
years. Nearly one-third of the Cypriot population, both Greek and
Turk, were now refugees in their own country. The island effectively
had been partitioned into two ethnic zones.
Although Turkish authorities refer to it as a “population exchange”
and the Republic of Cyprus authorities call it “ethnic cleansing,” one
effect of Turkey’s military action was to almost entirely empty northern Cyprus of its Greek Cypriot population. In 1974, Turkish Cypriots
comprised only about 18% of the country’s census and they chafed
under their minority status and political impotence. Even with the
arrival of 50,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees from the south who were
given a place to live, tens of thousands of Greek Cypriot homes, flats,
and properties in northern Cyprus stood abandoned, victim to the ravages of war. Almost as soon as the Turkish Army consolidated its territorial holdings, Turkish mainlanders began arriving on Cyprus.
Why did Turkish settlers come to the island in the first place? The
short answer is that they were invited and encouraged to do so. Turkish Cypriot journalist Sevgul Uludag answers this question in a 2004
column in which she highlighted the wretched living conditions suffered by settlers in Lefkosia, the northern Cypriot capitol: “Why were
they here? We know they are here because of the policies of Ankara.
Because they are looking for a better life. People are moving all over

160

Adrienne Christiansen

the world in search of a better life. In search of better options for their
kids. In search of getting more out of life.”15 Entirely different are the
issues that prompted the government in Ankara and the authorities
in the TRNC to extend invitations to Turkish mainlanders. Gilles Bertrand explains:
The first and official reason was to replace Greek Cypriot manpower in
the agricultural sector of the new northern zone. But the other reason
was to increase the ‘Turkish’ population in the island, to change the
demographic balance in order to negotiate later a better political representation for Turkish Cypriots, in case of an agreement. Thirdly, Turkish
settlers have been sent to achieve the ‘integration’ of Turkish Cypriots
into Turkish culture and nationalism. For all these reasons, the first settlers were veterans of the intervention and people from Central Anatolia,
one of Turkey’s most nationalist regions.16

To make Cyprus attractive to potential settlers, immigrants were
given animals, money, land, and homes that were owned by Greek
Cypriots who had fled to the south. Many settlers were also given citizenship rights mere days after arriving on the island, contravening the
TRNC’s policy of requiring residency for five years.
It is not surprising that many Greek Cypriots denigrate Turkish
immigrants in the press and in daily conversations. Given the number
of Greek deaths following the Turkish military operation, the destruction of their communities, churches, and cultural artifacts, and the lack
of access to their property or compensation for nearly thirty years,
Greek Cypriots tend to loathe the settlers who have benefited at their
expense. After all, the settlers live in their homes and farm their land.
The settlers symbolically represent the very embodiment of Greek
Cypriots’ fears, losses, resentments, and humiliation at the hands of
the Turkish military.
More surprising is the denigration of Turkish immigrants by Turkish Cypriots. On the surface, one might expect Turkish Cypriots to
have warm sentiments toward the Turkish immigrants with whom
they share a cultural heritage, at least in name. Cyprus lies only 40
miles from Turkey’s southern border. But differences in dress, dialect,
social attitudes, family size, and religious practices served to create
wide divisions between the two groups. Because of their dire poverty, some Turkish immigrants turned to criminal activity upon arriving in Cyprus, and thereby created the conditions leading to charges
that all settlers were criminals. Because of their religious conservatism,
161
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immigrants filled mosques and built minarets throughout rural northern Cyprus, in stark contrast to the highly secular Turkish Cypriots.
Because they knew that they were living in homes that did not legally
belong to them, many immigrants failed to make improvements to
the properties they were given, thereby feeding attitudes that they
were lazy, unkempt, or indifferent to their surroundings. Because they
came in large numbers and were willing to work for little money, the
immigrants put downward pressure on salaries, and thereby diminished economic opportunities for the more highly educated Turkish
Cypriots. Because they were physically and psychologically threatened at election time by Turkish soldiers, who noted that they could
be sent back to Turkey at any time,17 the immigrants historically voted
for Rauf Denktash and the reigning political authority.18 Denktash has
been President of the TRNC since 1974 and was, therefore, responsible
for inviting settlers to the island, providing them with resources, and
granting them citizenship rights.
In spite of their seemingly favored alliance with the political leadership of the TRNC, many Turkish immigrants lead very difficult lives.
According to one human rights leader with whom I spoke, settlers
tend to live in rural villages that are strictly divided between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish immigrants. Settlers’ children frequently go
to segregated schools and are discouraged from playing with other
children. Settlers receive low wages and their properties too often
lack electricity or adequate water supplies, even in the capital city of
Lefkosia.19 Families try to discourage intermarriage between a settler
and a Turkish Cypriot. One man told me that news of such a marriage
often is treated like a family dishonor, akin to “announcing that you
have contracted AIDS.”
Turkish immigrants have few resources in terms of non-governmental organizations or civil society groups advocating on their behalf.
History professor Nuri Cevikel was fired from his job at Eastern Mediterranean University in Famagusta because he opposed the policies
of TRNC President Rauf Denktash and organized a group to lobby
for Turkish settlers’ rights.20 Cevikel was the first member of a Turkish immigrant family to become a lecturer in northern Cyprus and his
firing demonstrates the precarious political position in which settlers
find themselves. Even progressive, bi-communal peace organizations,
which might find common cause with the settlers, tend to ignore the
settler community. One bi-communal leader reported to me that, “we
simply don’t allow settlers to participate in our organizations.” In her

162

Adrienne Christiansen

groundbreaking book The Line: Women, Partition, and the Gender Order
in Cyprus, Cynthia Cockburn challenges these types of prohibitions on
the part of progressive organizations. She includes rare interviews with
three settler women who achingly describe their pain at being socially
isolated in Cyprus.21 Cockburn also summarizes the work of Sevgul
Uludag, who has written the only in-depth journalistic accounts of settler life in northern Cyprus:
She [Uludag] found they do not regard themselves as the unitary group
Turkish Cypriots see them as being. Many identify less with Turkey than
with the particular region from which they come. They do not all, by
any means, agree with the right-wing political parties and the deep state
whose agents they are supposed to be. Many feel insecure, lacking the
deeds that would give them ownership of homes they have lived in for
years. They hear rumours they will be deported…many of them are not
so much beneficiaries as victims in the TRNC.22

Although it is not identical, much of the anti-settler sentiment on the
part of Turkish Cypriots (like that of Greek Cypriots) grows out of fear
and resentment. Discomfort with cultural differences such as dress or
religious practices may well account for some of the discriminatory
treatment that settlers face at the hands of Turkish Cypriots. More tellingly, though, settlers’ effects on the northern Cypriot economy arouse
intense anxiety and linguistic denigration. “The first wave of settlers
were [sic] mostly uneducated laborers. Sadly, they were treated as
intruders by some Turkish Cypriots who viewed themselves as being
more European and therefore superior.”23 Mete Hatay, an independent
researcher in northern Cyprus, underscores the economic dynamic
between Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish mainlanders in his explanation of the conflict between the two groups:
Turkish Cypriots having been a closed and isolated community for
years, especially in the 1960s, suddenly found themselves all together
in the north facing these newcomers and they reacted… . The prejudices are mainly a reaction from the petty bourgeois, who, ironically are
the ones who employ them. The image of this slave labour—the immigrant worker—is disturbing their European image, since they claim to
be European… . Most of these labourers work under extreme conditions,
up to 15 hours a day without proper accommodation, exploited by Turkish Cypriots and Turkish businessmen.24
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Clearly, economic-based fears play an important role, as these
quotes attest. Native Cypriots believe that the 30-year international
trade embargo against the TRNC, combined with the diminishing salaries due to the glut of cheap Turkish migrant labor, forces them to
emigrate to countries with more favorable economic opportunities.
“Unless we can join Europe along with the south of the island, my sons
will go to London…They have no future here. All the youngsters who
want to do something with their lives, they are leaving.”25 The fear
of having to leave Cyprus altogether is justified, as the population of
Turkish Cypriots declined from 118,000 to roughly 87,000 since 1974,
with most émigrés moving to London or Australia.26 One need only
compare the disparity in per capita annual incomes between southern
Cyprus ($12,000) and northern Cyprus ($4,000) to understand what
fuels Turkish Cypriot emigration patterns and economic anxieties.27
In addition to fear about economic effects, the denigration of Turkish
immigrants reflects resentment about their political effect, either real
or imagined. “Turkish Cypriots always discriminate against us. We are
only remembered at election time,” one woman says.28 Turkish Cypriots understandably chafe at seeing residency requirements waived for
the Turkish mainlanders who were given citizenship and voting rights
soon after their arrival on the island. Such practices lead to charges
that the TRNC government rigs elections29 in order to stay in power
and maintain the status quo—especially the “satellite state” relationship between northern Cyrus and the Turkish “motherland.” President
Denktash denies these charges. Moreover, press reports frequently
focus on Turkish Cypriots’ fear of being outnumbered by settlers and
of losing their indigenous culture due to demographic changes.30 Given
the dearth of reliable figures on the numbers of Turkish Cypriots and
Turkish settlers living in northern Cyprus, it is difficult to establish
whether or not these genuinely-felt fears are exaggerated. In May 2003,
however, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe published a report highly critical of the TRNC for its policies vis-á-vis Turkish immigrants, which the Assembly called “hidden colonization.” The
Rapporteur noted that such policies had a “considerable impact on the
demographic, social and economic structure of the Turkish Cypriot
community.”31
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*****
Taken by themselves, the derogatory and inflammatory names for
Turkish immigrants that I listed early in this essay could be read as
little more than racial bigotry. Cypriots who make such comments
could be labeled as racist and I might end by lamenting the ubiquity
of ethnic slurs found around the world.32 Indeed, I do lament ethnic slurs, especially when they are used as a substitute for the hard
work of arguing over policies and their effects. In this essay I have
endeavored to contextualize the slurs against Turkish settlers in order
to demonstrate that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots are culpable for
these unkind and discriminatory linguistic practices. I mean also to
highlight the good reasons why Cypriots have conflicts with the settlers
as well as illuminating their poor reasons. In my experiences on both
sides of the Green Line, I found individuals willing and even eager
to catalogue their grievances against the “other side,” which include
duplicity, corruption, war atrocities, mass graves, ethnic cleansing, and
a host of human rights violations. In contrast, I rarely found Cypriots
who would speak about their own side’s mistakes. Such courageous
individuals risk being labeled traitors and incurring the wrath of their
fellows. In a country like Cyprus, one must take death threats and
Grey Wolves very seriously.
From my limited vantage point as a foreigner, the ethno-nationalist conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots became increasingly
curious and frustrating. The very real suffering that grows out of that
conflict seems to “breathe up all the air” and thereby leaves little time,
energy, or resources for others on the island who also suffer. The needs
of Turkish settlers can be easily dismissed or “trumped.” A Greek
Cypriot government spokesman recently demonstrated this practice
when he said, “the issue of settlers was considered a ‘provocation and
violation of every humanitarian law principle,’ adding that there were
more serious examples of the violation of human rights in Cyprus, such
as the refugees situation, ‘which in fact is a clear method of ethnic
cleansing’” (emphasis added).33 “Our pain is simply greater than your
pain,” the spokesman seems to suggest, and therefore “we do not need
to pay attention” to the settlers’ pain.
Sadly, Turkish immigrants are caught between the hostility and
indifference of Greek Cypriots and the discrimination and disdain
of Turkish Cypriots. Turkish immigrants came to Cyprus as political pawns, as human bargaining chips, and to provide backbreak-
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ing labor. Among other reasons, the TRNC government welcomed
them as a means to consolidate power and to maintain close ties with
“Mother Turkey,” upon whom northern Cyprus is entirely dependent.
Ankara was happy to encourage the emigration of Turkish mainlanders because they would be “facts on the ground.” In other words, they
would help to keep Cyprus partitioned and secure Turkey’s claims on
northern Cyprus’ territory. Given the hardships they face and the ways
they have been used by their “enemies” and their “friends,” it is surprising that Turkish immigrants want to stay in Cyprus at all. Yet for
many young settlers and children, Cyprus is the only home they have
ever known. There is no place outside Cyprus to which they can “go
back.” That so many of their parents find in Cyprus a better life suggests the degree of hardships they must have faced in Turkey prior to
emigrating to the island.
Greek and Turkish Cypriots use very similar language to describe
Turkish immigrants. They share similar fears and resentments. They
practice a common rhetorical response of scapegoating and “mystifying” those who seem different and threatening. Many Cypriots see
themselves as modern Europeans and therefore superior to the settlers,
who are depicted as backwater peasants. Greek and Turkish Cypriots
are highly secular in contrast to the devoutly religious Sunni Muslims
who come from mainland Turkey. Both groups of Cypriots treat the
newcomers as “other” and seek to limit the settlers’ perceived political
power. Each seems inured to the dire conditions in which many settlers must live. The immigrant’s pains are “trumped” by the pains of
those Cypriots living on the island prior to 1974. Both groups see the
settlers as thieves, having stolen their homes and land in the case of
Greek Cypriots, and having stolen their elections and future in the case
of Turkish Cypriots. Many Cypriots on both sides of the island want to
see the settlers go home, wherever that may be, as long as it is not on
Cyprus.
For nearly thirty years, a combination of land mines, concrete barrels, barriers, barbed wire, and armed soldiers kept Greek and Turkish
Cypriots apart. Nationalist politicians defined themselves in opposition to the Cypriots on the other side of the Green Line and urged their
people to see themselves as ideologically and ethnically homogenous.
Bi-communal peace groups worked for decades under the most difficult circumstances to help Cypriots heal the divisions on the island
and to bring Greek and Turkish Cypriots together. Who would have
expected that poorly educated and impoverished Turkish immigrants
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unwittingly have done much to help Greek and Turkish Cypriots see
their interests as conjoined and not just conflicted? Setters symbolically
stand as the new “other” against whom Cypriots rhetorically project their anxieties. By their presence on the island and the perceived
threats they pose, Turkish immigrants play an important, if unwitting,
role in the long drive toward the reunification of Cyprus. That it may
come someday at their expense is deeply ironic and sad.
Can there be no other way? Must warring people always find or create a new enemy before they can join with their old one? Fortunately,
a handful of individuals on the island have the courage and conviction
to step forward and write about the immigrants’ humanitarian concerns.34 One such individual is Sevgul Uludag, who challenges Turkish
Cypriots to pay close attention to the physical and metaphorical “ghettos” in which Turkish settlers frequently live. She writes:
And how do we ‘break’ these ‘ghettos’ to normalize life on this island
so that what is called ‘the settlers’ would be treated like human beings,
would not be used by the regime against the Cypriots and would ‘find’
themselves? How do we deal with this sensitive and humanistic issue
within the boundaries of international law? How do we create space
within our own identities and cultures to refuse ghettos but at the same
time accept the differences? How do we combat racism and poverty?35

Mete Hatay echoes Uludag’s willingness to recognize Turkish
immigrants as individuals and not merely as interchangeable parts
of a whole. But he thinks it unlikely that the settlers can be more fully
embraced by Cypriots, at least not without major changes in attitudes.
He writes, “I’m not optimistic, because we still need to work on becoming human beings, respecting non-Cypriots, we have to stop being the
egotists of our own victimization.”36 Like Uludag and Hatay, only a
few Greek Cypriots in the south are willing to pay the price for speaking out on behalf of the immigrants. One writer of an unsigned opinion piece in the Greek Cypriot newspaper Cyprus Mail demonstrated
this courage:
What useful purpose is served by talking tough about the settlers? Apart
from helping the anti-solution camp in the north, it also creates a negative climate between the two communities. Even if we cite the legal
argument that the settlers are here as a result of a war crime, we cannot
ignore the other legal argument—that after 20 years on the island they
too have certain rights. Nothing is as simple and straightforward as the
politicians would have us believe.37
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These writers serve to remind us that another way exists, and that
the humanitarian concerns of our “enemies” need not be minimized
due to the pain one’s own people have suffered. In another article
about the settlers, Uludag illuminates the minimum conditions necessary to overcome the fear of those who are different from us: honesty,
openness to change, and recognizing the other’s humanity.
They have been used against the expression of the will of the Turkish
Cypriots throughout the 30 years they have been here. But they also
started changing and a considerable number of them wanting peace and
a solution on this island. ‘Settlers’ are also human beings with problems,
difficulties, families, kids…Perhaps we can learn to ‘treat’ them in a
human way rather than talking of them as though talking of a bag of
potatoes to be shipped back!…Whatever solution we find it should have
a human face where both Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and what we
call the ‘settlers’ can feel comfortable with.38

Cypriots have very good reasons for opposing the policies that
brought Turkish immigrants into their midst. Articulating those reasons or advocating changes to the policies is not racist. The ubiquity
of anti-immigrant rhetoric and settler slurs warrant deep concern,
however. Such talk dehumanizes the Turkish mainlanders and builds
new barriers to resolving the Cyprus problem. The phrase “Cyprus
problem” serves as shorthand for the well-known ethno-nationalist
conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In this writer’s opinion,
it is more accurate to refer to the range of immigrant-related issues and
derogatory discourse discussed here as “Cyprus’ problems.” Cypriots’
experiences with ethnic conflict in the past fifty years seem to have
done little to prepare them for the ethnic and multicultural challenges
of our times. This is especially lamentable because it suggests that
many more people will yet suffer on the island, that there will be continued calls to expel those who are most feared, and that new signs
will be erected at the Larnaca airport. 
•
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